Between Development and Security: The European Union, Governance and Fragile States by Hout, W. (Wil)
  
Between Development and Security:  
The European Union, Governance and Fragile States 
 
Paper  to be presented at the 51st ISA Annual Convention,  
New Orleans, 17‐20 February 2010  
Panel on ‘The Problem of the State: Crisis or Renewal?’ 
 
 
 
Wil Hout 
Professor of Governance and International Political Economy  
International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University  
PO Box 29776, 2502 LT The Hague, The Netherlands 
Email: hout@iss.nl 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This article focuses on the recent attention in the European Union for fragile states, as 
expressed, among others, in the European Security Strategy of 2003 and the European 
Consensus on Development of 2006. It is demonstrated that most understandings of the notion 
of state fragility concern limited state capacity, the inability of institutions to deal with social 
and political tensions or problems of state legitimacy. The European Union is no exception to 
this general trend of seeing state fragility in terms of governance deficits. The EU’s approach of 
preventing and responding to state fragility, which was adopted by the European Council in 
2007, is being tested in six pilot countries. This article analyses the governance-oriented 
measures that have been adopted in the Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) agreed between the 
European Commission and five of the six pilot countries. The paper concludes that there is a 
profound gap between the political-economic analyses of the CSPs and the support policies 
implemented by the EU. The approach of the European Commission revolves around attempts 
to reconstruct state capacities in fragile states through technocratic measures. Fundamental 
problems of state capture, ethnic relations, human rights violations and extreme inequalities are 
beyond the purview of policy makers in the European Union. 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the past five to seven years, most international aid donors have started to pay 
attention to so-called ‘fragile states’. Generally, the interest in state fragility was 
spurred by security considerations in the wake of the terrorist attacks of ‘9/11’. 
Fragile states came to be seen as a potential incubator of state collapse, which would 
result in the creation of ‘ungoverned spaces’, where crime and terrorism would 
develop.1 
Overall, the focus on fragility is part of a more general trend of ‘securitisation of 
development’, which is preoccupied with creating conditions for stability in the 
developing world. As Duffield has argued, ‘stability is achieved by activities designed 
to reduce poverty, satisfy basic needs, strengthen economic sustainability, create 
representative civil institutions, protect the vulnerable and promote human rights’.2 
The reconstruction of ‘fragile states’ is the latest witness to the securitisation of 
development. 
The European Union has been no exception to the general trend of addressing 
fragile states, although it took the Union roughly four years to translate the concerns 
about ‘state failure’ voiced in the European Security Strategy of 2003 into a policy on 
fragile states.3 The linkage of the EU’s policy on fragile states to security concerns 
has led to an emphasis of a wide set of policy instruments that make an explicit link 
among development, humanitarian, military and security aspects – sometimes referred 
to as a ‘whole-of-EU approach’.4 Within this framework, the governance dimension 
is emphasised – indeed, as will be argued in section 3 of this paper, the EU define
fragile states largely in terms of weak governance structures – but the way in which 
the agenda regarding those fragile states is implemented has strong security 
overtones.
s 
5 
After having emphasised more formal and technical aspects of governance since 
the mid-1990s (the era of the so-called post-Washington Consensus), various 
international aid agencies have recently started to emphasise the need for more 
profoundly political or political-economic analyses of the governance situation in aid-
receiving countries.6 In a report on the ‘lessons learnt’ of its involvement in ‘low 
income countries under stress’ (LICUS), the World Bank stressed already in 2005 the 
desirability of performing ‘political economy and conflict analysis’ when selecting 
and sequencing priorities for the rebuilding of fragile states. This position was 
reinforced by the Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group, which emphasised the need 
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for ‘commissioning and consuming’ good political analysis regarding countries where 
the Bank is actively involved.7 
In those instances where the European Union has incorporated governance issues 
into its strategies for fragile states, its approach to governance has a highly 
technocratic character, with a strong emphasis on public sector reform and public 
finance. This approach, the paper will argue, is in stark contrast with the increasing 
awareness in the donor community of the political-economic dimensions of 
governance reforms. In particular, the EU’s failure to take cognisance of the lessons 
formulated by the World Bank on the application of political-economy and conflict 
analysis is highly surprising. 
 This paper presents an analysis of recently adopted EU policies on fragile states. 
The next section gives an overview of diverging interpretations of fragile states, and 
discusses some general observations on policies towards fragile states. Section 3 
discusses the concept of fragile states as applied in the EU context. Section 4 provides 
an analysis of several Country Strategy Papers that were drawn up for fragile states in 
the context of the 10th European Development Fund (2008-13), and specifically the 
way in which concerns regarding governance rehabilitation have been entered into 
these documents. The final section of the paper presents some general conclusions. 
 
2. Fragile states: Definitions and Approaches 
Many authors have noted that the literature on fragile states has produced a wealth of 
definitions of state fragility. As observed by the World Bank, the term fragile states 
has gradually replaced concepts that were applied earlier – such as difficult 
partnerships, countries at risk, difficult environments, failing states and low income 
countrie under stress (LICUS) – since the adoption of the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness in March 2005.8 
 Despite the widespread use of the concept, a recent review of ‘thinking and 
practice’ concerning fragile states has noted that there is no single, ‘unambiguous’ 
definition. The survey argues that definitions can be grouped on the basis of a limited 
number of characteristics. The three types of definitions distinguished by Cammack et 
al. focus on, respectively: 
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• state functions: definitions of this type understand fragile states in terms of the lack 
of capacity or will to perform certain functions that contribute to the security and 
wellbeing of a country’s citizens;9  
• state outputs: this type of definitions sees fragile states as bringing about a host of 
problems, including poverty, violent conflict, terrorism, global security threats, 
refugees, organised crime, epidemic diseases and environmental degradation; such  
problems may cause difficulties in neighbouring countries or across a whole 
region;10 
• relationships with donors: this category of definitions understands fragile states in 
terms of the difficult relationship they have with a particular donor or group of 
donors. These definitions imply that fragility is seen to result from ‘factors that 
have more to do with the relationship (e.g. a particular shared history) than with 
the nature of the state itself’.11 
 
The main elements of the fragile state agenda implemented by international aid 
donors, according to Cammack et al., revolve around three key objectives: the 
promotion of human security, basic needs and peace by providing humanitarian aid 
and peacebuilding; the furthering of development and improvement of governance; 
and the provision of global security.12 Underlying this variety of objectives, some 
commentators have argued, is a focus on the inadequate functioning of the state, and 
most remedies consequently revolve around the strengthening of government 
institutions.13 
 Most policy-related definitions of fragile states can be classified in terms of one of 
the three categories mentioned above, as their focus is, understandably, on specific 
instances of state fragility that agencies wish to address. For instance, the definition 
applied by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee falls squarely within the 
first of Cammack et al.’s categories. According to the OECD/DAC, ‘[s]tates are 
fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic 
functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security 
and human rights of their populations’.14 The World Bank’s understanding of state 
fragility, which is laid out into two aspects, straddles the first and second categories of 
Cammack et al.’s classification. The first aspect that is mentioned by the World Bank 
focuses on the weakness of state policies and institutions; this is felt to reduce 
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seriously the state’s capacity to deliver services, control corruption and provide 
sufficient voice and accountability. The second aspect concerns the increased risk of 
countries to experience conflict and political instability.15 
 Despite the desire in policy-making circles to develop clear-cut models of state 
fragility and differentiate fragile from stable developing countries, several important 
caveats have been formulated with regard to the implementation of policies on fragile 
states. The OECD/DAC has pointed out that state fragility in not an either-or issue, 
but rather a ‘spectrum …. found in all but the most developed and institutionalised 
states’. This notion links to a wider set of factors, most or all of which highlight the 
need for a political response to fragility. According to the OECD/DAC, the 
understanding of fragility as a range instead of a single condition leads to a focus on 
resilience (‘the ability to cope with changes in capacity, effectiveness, or legitimacy’) 
rather than stability as the opposite of fragility: ‘Resilience, we argue, therefore 
derives from a combination of capacity and resources, effective institutions and 
legitimacy, all of which are underpinned by political processes that mediate state-
society relations and expectations’.16 
 The emphasis of the political nature of the response to fragile states has brought 
both the OECD/DAC and the World Bank to call for context-specific action. The first 
of the ‘Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations’, 
drafted in early 2005 and adopted by Development Ministers and Heads of Agencies 
in the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee in April 2007, emphasises the 
need to differentiate whether problems derive from a lack of capacity, political  
will or legitimacy. Moreover, the principles point out that policies on fragile states 
need to be tailored to the dynamics of the countries concerned. In line with similar 
conclusions reached earlier by the World Bank, the OECD argued that it is crucially 
important to recognise whether countries are going through a phase of political 
transition, are in a situation of deteriorating or rather improving governance, or have 
become locked into a political impasse17.  
 In a discussion of its experience with the LICUS framework, the World Bank 
argued that the implementation of institutional reform in fragile states should 
recognise local dynamics instead of adopting a one-size-fits-all approach: 
In most fragile state contexts, developing technical suggestions for institutional 
reform is easy; managing the political process of reform is much more difficult. It 
is therefore important that institution-building initiatives avoid purely technocratic 
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approaches, devoting considerable attention to the process of decision-making and 
implementation, and to well-designed participation and widespread communication 
of reform initiatives. The ‘fit’ of institutional structures with local realities has also 
frequently been problematic in fragile states, due to ill-adapted colonial legacies or 
the imposition of inappropriate external models: remaining open to new ideas for 
locally-driven institutional reforms and supporting local debate and discussion on 
options is critical.18 
Among a host of other observations, the 2006 review of the LICUS framework by the 
Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group produced a set of conclusions about the need 
for the analysis of the political situation and the causes of conflict in fragile states. An 
incisive comment regarding one of the fragile states targeted by the Bank illustrates 
the need for internalisation of political analysis: 
For example, the Interim Strategy in Papua New Guinea has a good discussion of 
the political system. It recognizes the problems of clan loyalties, political 
patronage, corruption, lack of capacity, and other factors, but the Strategy then 
goes on to disregard some of this vital knowledge and treat these issues as 
technical problems.19 
In particular, four types of political analysis seem relevant for policy-making on 
fragile states. Political risk analysis would produce an assessment of the likelihood of 
future instability in a fragile state, while structural analysis would enhance 
understanding of the weakness of the state as a result of structural (for instance, 
ethnically or religiously based) sources of conflict. The analysis of day-to-day politics 
would lead to more insight into the distribution of power at the national, regional and 
local level, and would provide a clue as to whether decentralisation policies are likely 
to succeed or not. The analysis of the history of reform in the country and in 
neighbouring countries would contribute to an understanding of which reform 
policies are likely to be accepted by the population and which stand more chance of 
being resisted.20 
 This section has highlighted different understandings of the nature of fragile states 
and agendas to address the problems associated with such states. Moreover, the 
section has summarised some of the lessons drawn with regard to the political aspects 
of the response to fragile states. On the basis of the above, it seems safe to conclude 
that most understandings of fragile states revolve around the (mal)functioning of the 
state in developing countries as a result of limited capacity, the inability of institutions 
to deal with social and/or political tensions or the lack of state legitimacy. Analyses of 
the implementation of the policies on fragile states (by, for instance, the World Bank 
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and OECD) point at the centrality of adopting political analyses of processes and 
events in developing countries in order to understand local specificities that are 
causing fragility. 
 
3. The EU and Fragile States 
The European Union has begun to place increasing emphasis on so-called ‘fragile 
states’ with the adoption of its ‘security strategy’, drafted by CFSP High 
Representative Javier Solana, in 2003. The key threats to Europe that were outlined in 
the strategy included ‘state failure’, which was perceived both as a threat in itself and 
as a possible contributing factor toward other types of threats. The European security 
strategy defined state failure as a ‘key threat’, because  
‘[b]ad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of 
accountability – and civil conflict corrode States from within. … Collapse of the 
State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or terrorism. 
State failure is an alarming phenomenon, that undermines global governance, and 
adds to regional instability’.21 
The strategy argued that various instruments should be applied by the European 
Union, ranging from military force to diplomatic engagement, trade relations, 
development aid and humanitarian assistance. In relation to developing countries, the 
strategy argued that ‘[s]ecurity is the first condition for development’.22 Further to 
this, the ‘European Consensus on Development’, agreed by the Council, Commission 
and European Parliament in December 2005, called for a ‘comprehensive prevention 
approach to state fragility, conflict, natural disasters and other types of crises’.23 
 In 2003, the European Commission presented a framework on governance and 
development that distinguished several types of relations that would later be 
subsumed under the lable of ‘fragile states’: ‘difficult’ and ‘extremely difficult’ 
partnership and ‘post-conflict’ situations.24 Each of these relations, the Commission 
argued, would require different approaches. In the case of difficult partnerships, 
which are ‘characterised by a lack of commitment to good governance’, alternative 
approaches to cooperation would have to be found, including the provision of 
humanitarian aid, collaboration with NGOs and civil society organisations, and 
political initiatives at the international and regional level. In ‘extremely difficult 
partnerships’ the only option would be to suspend cooperation entirely. Post-conflict 
situations, where state institutions are either non-functioning or non-existent, would 
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call for attempts at reconciliation between parties involved in the conflict, a process of 
relief, rehabilitation and development, and the provision of humanitarian aid. The aim 
of the approach would be to have the authorities address governance issues, which 
were seen to lie at the root of the conflict in many cases.25 
  The Conclusions formulated by the General Affairs and External Relations 
Council (GAERC) in November 2007 on the basis of the Commission’s 
Communication understood state fragility in reference to 
weak or failing structures and to situations where the social contract is broken due 
to the State’s incapacity or unwillingness to deal with its basic functions, meet its 
obligations and responsibilities regarding the rule of law, protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, security and safety of its population, poverty 
reduction, service delivery, the transparent and equitable management of resources 
and access to power.26 
The Commission’s Communication referred to fragility as a feature mainly of low and 
middle income countries that are faced with structural weaknesses of the economy, 
and are vulnerable to crises, external shocks, epidemics, drug trafficking, natural 
disasters, environmental degradation, and endangered cultural diversity. Governance 
deficits, however, were seen as the main cause of state fragility: ‘Fragility is often 
triggered by governance shortcomings and failures, in form of lack of political 
legitimacy compounded by very limited institutional capacities linked to poverty’.27 
 The Council Conclusions of November 2007 contained a long list of ‘issues’ that 
should be addressed in the EU’s approach of preventing and responding to state 
fragility. Apart from general issues such as attention for democratic governance, 
support of state capabilities and gender equality, the list included: 
 
• the improvement of existing governance assessment tools; 
• the development of early warning mechanisms on democratic governance issues, 
rule of law, human rights, poverty levels and conflict; 
• the strengthening of the role of Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) as the preferred 
framework to prevent and address fragility; 
• the strengthening of allocation criteria in the various aid schemes applied by the 
European Community for both ACP and non-ACP countries; 
• the integration of democratic governance and institutional development into the so-
called LRRD (Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development) framework; 
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• the use of the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in 
order to channel more funds to developing countries that display signs of state 
fragility and that would run the risk of being excluded from development 
assistance (so-called ‘aid orphans’).28 
 
In order to start addressing the issue of state fragility at the level of European 
Community development policy, the Council requested the Commission to ‘test’ the 
EU response in pilot cases. Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Timor-Leste 
and Yemen were selected as pilot countries for this purpose.29  
 
4. Governance-Oriented Responses to State Fragility: Analysis of Country 
Strategy Papers 
This section contains an analysis of governance-oriented responses in several of the 
‘pilot’ countries selected by the European Commission: Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, 
Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste and Yemen.30 The analysis is performed on the basis of 
the Country Strategy Papers that have been concluded by European Community and 
the countries concerned in the context of either the Development Cooperation 
Instrument (for non-ACP countries) or the 10th European Development Fund for 
period between 2008 and 2013 (for ACP coun
the 
tries). 
 
4.1 Burundi 
In the framework of the 10th EDF, Burundi has been allocated €188 million as so-
called A allocation under the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement for macroeconomic 
support, sectoral policies and for programmes and projects in support of focal and 
non-focal areas of Community assistance. The country will be receiving another €24.1 
million as B allocation for unforeseen needs, such as emergency aid, debt relief and 
support to mitigate instability of export earnings.31 
 The analysis of the political and institutional situation in Burundi in the CSP points 
at the continuing violation of human rights and the rule of law despite the ‘political 
will’ to make improvements in both respects. The failure to bring an end to the armed 
struggle between the government and the rebel Hutu party is ascribed to the lack of 
experience and capacity of the armed forces and the police. The constitutional 
guarantees for ethnic and religious diversity, adopted in 2005, and power-sharing 
arrangements in state institutions and state-owned enterprises are judged to have 
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improved the relations between the rivalling ethnic groups (Hutus and Tutsis).32 The 
democratic process is still felt to be fragile; further democratic consolidation is seen to 
require better cooperation between the majority party, the other political parties and 
civil society.33 
 Burundi’s Strategic Growth and Poverty Reduction Framework (Cadre stratégique 
de croissance et de lutte contre la pauvreté, CSLP), adopted in 2006, contains four 
central ‘axes’, among which improvement of governance and security was considered 
a ‘sine qua non’ for national reconciliation and economic development. The main 
activities relate to the security sector, such as: general and permanent cease-fire; 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combattants; 
professionalisation of the security forces; and disarmament of the population. Further, 
strengthening of the rule of law and the fight against impunity are mentioned as 
central to the strengthening of governance.34 
 The CSP for 2008-13 notes that various measures on good governance that had 
formed part of the previous CSP (for 2003-7) concluded between Burundi and the 
European Community had not been implemented until Feburary 2007. The €19.75 
million involved will be allocated to strengthening the central and local legal system, 
public sector management, and decentralisation of public administration.35 
 In the CSP 2008-13, rural development and health are chosen as the concentration 
areas for EC support. Good governance issues, most notably public finance 
management, are mentioned as a component of the programmes to be implemented in 
each of these areas, as well as for budget support.36 Governance-oriented projects and 
programmes, which are included in the non-focal areas of the CSP, will receive an 
allocation of €10 million during the 10th EDF. These funds are meant for: 
• state reform with an eye to issues of justice, decentralisation, civil service, security, 
and land and infrastructure; 
• reinforcement of control mechanisms such as the national auditor’s office, 
anticorruption services and inspection services; 
• bringing in line national legislation with international human rights norms; 
• support to decentralisation policies; and 
• cofinancing of the next elections.37 
 
4.2 Guinea-Bissau 
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The CSP agreed between the European Community and Guinea-Bissau for the 2008-
13 period resulted in an allocation of almost €103 million to the country. The A 
allocation of €100 million contains an allocation of €27 million for programmes 
aimed at strengthening the rule of law and democracy.38 
 The political and institutional analysis of Guinea-Bissau points at the country’s 
history of political violence and coups d’état. The causes of the political problems, 
according to the CSP, are diverse, and include the country’s weak economic basis, its 
lack of social cohesion produced by ethnic cleavages, and the recent military 
conflict.39 The CSP considers the national elections of 2004 and 2005 as steps on the 
way to a normal constitutional and political situation, despite the fact that political 
stability has remained fragile as a result of tensions between the president and the 
parliamentary majority. Moreover, the CSP notes that civilian control over the armed 
forces and the presence of arms among the population remain problematic, and 
necessitate reform of the security sector.40 
The CSP argues that Guinea-Bissau’s public administration structures, in particular 
public control institutions, are weak. The low degrees of transparency in resource 
management and public finance are seen as serious issues, as weaknesses in these 
areas lead to corruption, fraud, money laundering and tax evasion. As the legal 
framework is weak, the population has insufficient access to justice and the business 
environment is unfavourable.41 
Guinea-Bissau’s poverty reduction strategy for 2006-8 (Documento de Estratégia 
Nacional para a Redução de Pobreza, DENARP) contains a focus on strengthening  
governance, modernising public administration and improving macroeconomic 
stability, along with promoting economic growth, improving access to social services 
and basic infrastructure, and improving the living conditions of vulnerable groups.42 
The CSP 2008-13 emphasises, in particular, measures to support the rule of law and 
democracy, aimed at the consolidation of central state organs, public sector reform 
and reform of the security sector, including reintegration of former soldiers. These 
activities receive 90 per cent of the €27 available for this domain. Next to this, 
support of the National Authorising Officer and electoral support involve another €3 
million. A further amount of €32 million in budget support is meant for economic 
stabilisation, and should assist Guinea-Bissau on the way to establishing ‘good 
economic governance’ and public finance management.43 
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4.3 Sierra Leone 
Under the 10th EDF, Sierra Leone received an allocation of €242 million in the A 
envelope and an additional €26.4 in the B envelope. Approximately 15 per cent of the 
A envelope will be spent on good governance and institutional support.44 
 The CSP’s analysis of the political situation focuses on the impact of the civil war, 
which lasted from 1991 until 2002, destroyed the country’s infrastructure and political 
institutions, and led to a massive outflow of refugees to neighbouring countries. The 
roots of the civil war are traced to the centralisation of power, the absence of 
accountability in the co-opted civil service and widespread corruption. The EU’s 
assessment is that the country ‘remains an extremely “fragile state”, with a poorly 
resourced civil service that lacks capacity, operated inefficiently and lacks even the 
basic facilities to deliver adequate services’.45 
 Despite the fact that national and local elections were held since 2002, the CSP 
concludes that Sierra Leone is lacking democratic and effective governance, and 
effective oversight mechanisms (such as Parliament and the judiciary). Regionalism 
and locality are important in the country, and political allegiance, according to the 
CSP, is based in social networks that are tied to particular places. The danger of 
internal instability is assessed to be real.46 
 The Joint Response Strategy, set up by the EC and the UK, is aimed at governance, 
peace and security; the promotion of pro-poor growth; and basic service delivery and 
human development. Measures that are suggested to support good governance and 
institutional reform are: 
• the strengthening of democratic institutions by improving the country’s capacity 
for holding free and fair elections and by giving assistance to the electoral process, 
including voter and civic education, political registration and awareness-raising; 
• support of the decentralisation process (a first phase focusing on finalisation of the 
legal framework and capacity-building in financial management, procurement and 
human resources, and a second phase of capacity-building aimed at the 
management structures of decentralised sectors and services); 
• support of civil service reform, aimed at restructuring and ‘right-sizing’, and 
capacity-building within the civil service for the implementation of the country’s 
Poverty Reduction Strategy; and 
• support for a variety of actors in the public sector and for civil society.47 
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 4.4 Timor-Leste 
In 2007, Timor-Leste received an allocation of approximately €64 million as part of 
the 10th EDF multi-annual agreements, €63 million of which is assigned in the 
country’s A envelope.48 
 Timor-Leste’s CSP stresses that the country’s road to independence was rather 
violent, with Indonesian military forces attempting to maintain the country’s grip on 
East Timor. After independence in 1999, there were several periods of violent unrest, 
most recently in 2006. Causes for the 2006 crisis included the resurfacing of divisions 
that predated 1999 – in particular the failure to do justice in view of the crimes 
preceding independence – and poverty among youth and urban population, resulting 
in a legitimacy crisis of the government. Although peaceful elections were held in 
2007, several sources of instability persist, such as the presence of many weapons 
among the civilian population, the vast number of displaced persons and the 
widespread discontent among members of the security forces.49 
 Under the 9th EDF, a CSP was agreed in 2006 for support to rural development 
and institutional capacity-building. The latter priority led to a focus on the 
development of a trade policy, support for electoral processes and the electoral 
system, and institutional capacity-building in the area of public finance 
management.50 
 The EC’s assistance under the 10th EDF aims to support the government’s 
National Development Plan in three areas: rural development, health and institutional 
capacity-building. Institutional capacity-building, which is supported with €13 
million, or 21 per cent of the means provided in the CSP, focused on five main 
activities: 
• support of the judiciary, such as the training of judges and lawyers and capacity-
building of various courts; 
• improvement of the capacity and performance of the civil service and support for 
decentralisation processes; 
• strengthening of the institutional capacities of the national Parliament; 
• support of communication media, with the aim of enhancing understanding and 
providing information within institutions and with the population; and 
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• support to the National Authorising Officer to improve implementation of EC 
programmes in Timor-Leste. 
Apart from assistance for these activities, the CSP contains support for non-state 
actors and for governance-related joint initiatives with Portuguese-speaking African 
countries.51 
 
4.5 Yemen 
Being a developing country outside the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries (in the Commission’s parlance it is part of its relationships with ‘East of 
Jordan developing countries’), Yemen was allocated €60 million in the 2007-2010 
Multiannual Indicative Programme for support to promote good governance and fight 
poverty and hunger. This allocation draws on various Commission instruments, 
notably the Development Cooperation Instrument, the so-called Instrument for 
Stability, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, and certain 
thematic programmes.52 
 Yemen’s CSP emphasises the lack of reform of the country’s political system 
despite the continued existence of serious political problems. Notably, the CSP 
highlights the weak role of the legislative and judiciary institutions vis-à-vis the 
executive, the existence of widespread corruption in the country (referred to as a 
‘deal-killer’ of many initiatives), continued human rights issues and discrimination of 
women, and security issues springing from the presence of terrorist groups in the 
country and the use of the country as a transit point for militants and weapons.53 
Despite its analysis, the CSP argues that ‘by regional standards, democracy is 
reasonably well-developed in Yemen’.54 
 The four priority areas of Yemen’s CSP for the 2002-2006 period (food security; 
poverty reduction; good governance, democracy and human rights; and business 
development and the strenghtening of economic institutions) were reduced to two in 
the current CSP. Two-thirds of the Commission’s funds reserved for Yemen in the 
2007-2010 have been allocated to strengthening ‘the Yemeni government’s capacities 
to fight poverty’. The €19.5 million allocated to strengthen governance quality are 
divided over a programme aimed at strengthening the electoral framework and 
institutions, groups of parliamentarians and political parties, and a programme 
targeting the judicial system in order to strengthen the rule of law and human rights. 
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Component of the programmes targeting governance quality in Yemen are the 
following: 
• support of the Supreme Election Committee to deliver credible free and fair 
elections, in particular through voter education and the raising of citizens’ 
awareness; 
• assistance to a selected group of members of parliament belonging to political 
parties across the political spectrum in order to develop their capacity to represent 
citizens’ interests and to link with civil society; 
• support of six commercial courts and certain courts of the civil and penal judiciary 
to train judges and implement court rules in a transparent manner; 
• attention for the mainstreaming of human rights in penal courts and the security 
forces, with an emphasis on dealing with suspects and interrogating them 
according to international standards.55 
 
4.6 CSPs and the EC Response to Fragile States 
The discussion of the Country Strategy Papers agreed by the European Commission 
with various fragile states has illustrated some of the challenges inherent in the 
formulating of a strategy to deal with state fragility. As all CSPs follow the same 
format, it has been possible to compare the political(-economic) analyses that are 
underlying the EC’s approach to the different fragile states, as well as the main 
components of the EC’s response strategy for these countries. 
 The analyses of the political-economic situation in the five cases described in 
sections 4.1 to 4.5 illustrate the resolve of the European Commission to ground its 
response strategy in an understanding of the local dynamics of the countries 
concerned. From a methodological point of view, one could question the transparency 
and reliability of the analyses, which do not provide an insight into the sources on the 
basis of which judgements are made, and have apparently not involved independent 
analysts from outside the Commission. The Commission’s account of political-
economic problems in the countries concerned demonstrate, however, the wish to 
present a substantively sound and policy-relevant comprehension of the main causes 
of state fragility. In a majority of cases (Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone and 
Yemen), it was argued, with reference to some independent accounts, that the 
Commission’s analyses did not seem to dig deep enough to uncover the structural or 
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root causes of the problems experienced by the countries concerned. Yet, despite this 
criticism, it is clear that the Commission’s analyses reflect a general agreement about 
the manifestation of the problems in the five fragile states. 
 The content of the response strategies for the fragile states shows, however, a 
profound gap between the political-economic analyses and the measures adopted in 
the EC’s support packages. The various measures are compared in table 1. Table 1 
illustrates the dominance of certain types of responses to the problems in fragile 
states: public sector reform, decentralisation and public finance management are key 
to the EC’s approach in all cases analysed above. Also, support of electoral processes 
at the national or local level shows up as a measure in a majority of the fragile states 
studied. Security sector reform, support of the justice sector and support of central 
state organs are each mentioned in the case of two of the five fragile states. Finally, 
anti-corruption and civil society support show up in one case. 
 
Table 1: EC Support Strategies in Five Fragile States 
 Burundi Guinea-Bissau Sierra Leone Timor-Leste Yemen 
Public sector 
reform 
x x x x  
Decentralisation x  x x  
Public finance 
management 
x x  x  
Electoral 
support 
x x x  x 
Security sector 
reform 
x x   x 
Support/reform 
of justice sector 
   x x 
Support of 
Parliament and 
central state 
organs 
 x  x x 
Anti-corruption x     
Civil society 
support 
  x   
Sources: Country Strategy Papers 2007-2013 Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste and 
Yemen56 
 
 The listing of priority areas in table 1 makes it clear that the general approach of 
the European Commission is to assist in reconstructing state capacities in fragile 
states through essentially technical and managerial measures. In a good number of the 
cases analysed in this paper, such technocratic measures do not seem to square with 
the analysis of the problems made either in the CSPs or by independent analysts. 
Issues raised in the analyses of state fragility relate to problems of state capture, 
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including patronage and clientelism, violent resistance of groups against central 
government, ethnic divisions, human rights violations, weak socio-economic basis, 
and extreme inqualities and social exclusion or marginalisation of particular groups. 
The failure to address the fundamental problems underlying state fragility raises 
serious questions about the effectiveness of the EC’s policy on fragile states (cf. 
Taylor’s contribution to this special issue). 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has tried to make sense of the current focus, within the European Union, 
on the issue of state fragility. The paper has argued that the EU’s concern with the 
issue has had strong security overtones, and that the EU response fits in with the 
overall trend of securitisation of development. The choice of countries for inclusion in 
fragile state framework seems to reflect the central role played by security 
considerations, but the paucity of data at this moment do not permit more than a 
provisional answer. In this context, Briscoe has made an important observation that 
may serve as a hyporthesis for further research. He argued that the choices made in 
Europe and North America on fragile states have been informed by ‘the significant 
role played by many of the world’s most fragile states in supplying to the developed 
world energy and raw materials, producing and trafficking drugs, purchasing arms, 
generating off-shore capital, or serving as significant outposts in the “war on 
terror”’.57 
 The EU’s approach to fragile states has tended to concentrate on the governance 
dimensions of the problems in the countries concerned: the definition of state fragility 
that was adopted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council in November 
2007 reflects this focus. The EU’s understanding, discussed in section 3 of the paper, 
is that state fragility implies a breakdown of the social contract due to a state’s failure 
to perform its major functions, including the provision of the rule of law, security, 
poverty reduction, service delivery and resource management. 
 As was argued in section 2 of the paper, the recent discussion on governance and 
fragile states in policy-making circles has produced several lessons for external actors. 
In particular, assessments of earlier interventions have led organisations such as the 
World Bank and the OECD to emphasise context-specific action, based on throrough 
knowledge of the local situation, and the need for a political analysis of processes and 
events spurring state fragility. The EU’s approach to governance and state fragility 
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does not seem to pay sufficient attention to these insights. The EU’s methodology on 
assessing governance, as reflected in the recently adopted ‘governance profile’ (see 
the Introduction to this special issue), emphasises formal indicators of governance 
quality and pays insufficient attention to salient political or political-economic issues, 
such as social exclusion, inequality and state capture. Moreover, the analysis of 
various Country Strategy Papers in section 4 has illustrated that the European 
Commission’s ‘response strategies’ for the pilot fragile states show quite some 
disparity between the understanding of local political-economic dynamics and the 
measures adopted to support the fragile states. In particular, the CSPs focus on the 
reconstruction of state capacities dominantly by technical and managerial means that 
overlook more fundamental political-economic problems in the countries concerned. 
 It seems safe to conclude that the EC’s approach to reconstructing fragile states 
reflects the view, discussed in section 2, that the real problem of these countries lies in 
the inadequate functioning of the state, i.e., inadequate when looked at from prevalent 
Western conceptions of the ‘modern’ state. This approach overlooks the fact that the 
state is essentially an institution that is embedded in local social, political and 
economic realities, and that the way in which the state functions (or not) needs to be 
understood in terms of specific social, political or economic interests. In this respect, 
the analysis made by Chabal and Daloz in relation to the African state is very 
pertinent. These authors have argued that judgements on the ‘failure’ of the state in 
Africa are essentially a function of the Weberian approach to the state. The 
dominance of the ‘fundamentally instrumental concept of power’ has given rise to the 
‘informalisation of politics’ and the ‘instrumentalisation’ of the state.58 The question, 
therefore, is not so much whether the fragile state ‘works’, but rather for whom it 
works. Attempts to reconstruct fragile states need to be grounded in an understanding 
of the political-economic realities of the countries concerned, in particular of the 
incentives, challenges and opportunities faced by various actors.59 Policies that do not 
take account of the local political economy of fragile states are bound to fail. 
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